Having studied philosophy as an undergraduate at the University of Bologna (Laurea 2000) and the University of California, Berkeley, in 2001 I moved to Cambridge (St. John’s College) to read for a Ph.D. in Classics (obtained in 2005).
From 2004 to 2007 I was a Lumley Research Fellow at Magdalene College, Cambridge; during this period I also lectured courses in ancient philosophy at Cambridge and King’s College London. From 2007 to 2015 I was a member of the Department of Classics and Ancient History of Durham University, first as a Lecturer in Ancient Philosophy, and then a Senior Lecturer. I have been an Associate Professor of Ancient Greek Philosophy at the Faculty of Philosophy of Oxford University, and a Stavros Niarchos Foundation Clarendon Fellow in Ancient Greek Philosophy at Oriel College since September 2015.
At Oriel I teach a variety of papers in ancient philosophy, and ethics.
My research interests focus on ancient philosophy, especially ancient dialectic and logic, ancient epistemology and scepticism, and ancient conceptions of memory and learning. My first book, Ancient Self-Refutation (Cambridge University Press 2010), is a comprehensive analysis of ancient self-refutation arguments from Democritus to Augustine, with a few glimpses at the medieval period.
I am currently co-authoring an introduction to Ancient Logic (with Paolo Fait, for Routledge), and editing The Cambridge Companion to Ancient Logic. I am also writing a series of articles on ancient logic, ethics and epistemology (for more details see https://sites.google.com/site/lucacastagnoli/). My next major research project is a monograph on Ancient Philosophers on Memory, Recollection and Forgetting.
Ancient Self-Refutation: The Logic and History of the Self-Refutation Argument From Democritus to Augustine, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010, 414pp. A digest of reviews of the book can be found here.
‘Self-bracketing Pyrrhonism’, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, XVIII (2000), 263-328.
‘L’elenchos di Agatone: Una rilettura di Platone, Simposio, 199c3-201c9’, Dianoia, VI (2001), 39-84.
‘Protagoras Refuted: How Clever is Socrates’ “Most Clever” Argument at Theaetetus 171a-c?’, Topoi, XXIII 1 (2004), 3-32.
‘Il condizionale crisippeo e le sue interpretazioni moderne’, Elenchos, XXV 2 (2004), 353-395.
‘Memoria Aristotelica, Memoria Agostiniana’, in G. A. Lucchetta, U. La Palombara (eds.), Mente, anima e corpo nel mondo antico. Immagini e funzioni, Pescara: Opera Editrice, 2006, 141-160.
‘Liberal Arts and Recollection in Augustine’s Confessions X (ix 16 - xii 19)’, Philosophie Antique, VI (2006) [De Platon aux platoniciens], 107-135.
‘Everything is true, Everything is False: Self-Refutation Arguments from Democritus to Augustine’, Antiqvorvm Philosophia, I (2007), 11-74.
‘Synartēsis crisippea e tesi di Aristotele’, in M. Alessandrelli, M. Nasti De Vincentis (eds.), La logica nel pensiero antico (Atti del I Colloquio, Roma 28-29 Novembre 2000), Napoli: Bibliopolis, 2009, 105-163.
‘How Dialectical Was Stoic Dialectic?’, in A. Nightingale, D. Sedley (eds.), Ancient Models of Mind: Studies in Human and Divine Rationality, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010, 153-179.
‘Logica antica’ (co-authored with W. Cavini), in U. Eco (ed.), L’antichità. Vol. 14: Temi trasversali, Milano: Encyclomedia Publishers, 2012, 110-161.
‘Ancient Philosophy of Language’ (co-authored with E. V. Di Lascio), in D. G. Fara, G. Russell (eds.), Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Language, 2012, 811-826.
‘Aristotle on Begging the Question Between Dialectic, Logic and Epistemology’, Logical Analysis and History of Philosophy, XV (2012), 90-121.
‘Self-refutation and Dialectic in Plato and Aristotle’, in J. L. Fink (ed.), Dialectic and Dialogue: The Development of Dialectic from Plato to Aristotle, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012, 27-61.
‘Democritus and Epicurus on Sensible Qualities in Plutarch, Against Colotes 3-9’, Aitia. Regards sur la culture hellénistique au XXIe siècle, III (2013) [Open access at http://aitia.revues.org/622 ].
‘Early Pyrrhonism: Pyrrho to Aenesidemus’, in F. Sheffield, J. Warren (eds.), Routledge Companion to Ancient Philosophy, 2013, 496-510.
‘Aristotle on the Non-Cause Fallacy’, History and Philosophy of Logic (first published online 8 October 2015), 37 (2016), 9-32.
‘Aristote sur la pétition de principe’, for J.-B. Gourinat and J. Lemaire (eds.), Logique and dialectique dans l’Antiquité, Paris: Vrin, 2016, 259-302.
‘Skeptical Ethics’, in C. Bobonich (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Ancient Ethics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017.
‘Aenesidemus’, in D. Machuca, B. Reed (eds.) Skepticism: From Antiquity to the Present, London and Oxford: Bloomsbury, 2017.
‘Aporia and inquiry in Ancient Pyrrhonism’, in V. Politis, G. Karamanolis (eds.), The Aporetic Tradition in Ancient Philosophy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming.
‘Dialectic in the Hellenistic Academy’, for T. Bénatouïl and K. Ierodiakonou (eds.), Proceedings of the 13th Symposium Hellenisticum on Dialectic in Hellenistic Philosophy, forthcoming.